Taxation - Contest Awards, Compensation or Gift by Wittak, John J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 2 Fall 1951 Article 9
Taxation - Contest Awards, Compensation or Gift
John J. Wittak
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
John J. Wittak, Taxation - Contest Awards, Compensation or Gift, 35 Marq. L. Rev. 208 (1951).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol35/iss2/9
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Taxation- Contest Awards, Compensation or Gift - The
plaintiff, a professor of music, completed a musical composition in
1939 as a contribution to the field of music. Six years later the plain-
tiff was persuaded to enter the score in the Reichhold Music Award
Contest. Mr. Henry Reichhold, industrialist and philanthropist, had
announced the contest for ". . . the furtherance of a spirit of under-
standing and unity among Nations; and also to be helpful in bringing
to the public the most important new music written in the Americas."
The plaintiff's score was selected as the best submitted and in 1947 he
received the highest award of $25,000. The composition remained the
property of the plaintiff and neither Mr. Reichhold nor the Award
Committee derived any profit from the contest or from the plaintiff's
participation in it. The plaintiff included the award as income for the
year 1947 and then instituted a refund action in 1949 on the theory
that the money was received as a gift. Held: The award constitutes a
"gift" and is excluded from the plaintiff's income under Section 22 (b)
(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Robertson v. United States, 93 F.
Supp. 660 ( U.S. Dist. Ct., Utah, 1950).
The courts and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are in seri-
ous disagreement, as is readily perceptible from court decisions and
Commisioners' rulings, whether to consider awards as "income derived
from any source whatever"' or being excluded therefrom by reason
of the statutory exemption for a "gift."'2 It is best to distinguish be-
cause of the fine line of demarcation between them, prizes won as a
result of commercial contests and awards received as a result of
scholarly work.
Generally the courts and the Commissioner will view prizes
achieved in commercial contests as income. An award attained by a
contestant in a newspaper contest promulgated as an advertising stunt
was considered taxable income ;3 and an automobile won as a result of
a contest conducted by a restaurant was considered income at its fair
market value. 4 However the Tax Court has held that money received
in a contest in which the recipient performed no services before or
after the award, was to be considered a "gift."5 The Commissioner
in his rulings has specified that when determining whether an award
I IRC Sec. 22 (a "General Definition.-'Gross income' includes gains, profits,
and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service,
... or from professions, vocations, trades, business, commerce .... or gains
or profits and income derived from any source whatever. .. "
2 IRC Sec. 22 (b) "Exclusions from Gross Income.-The following items
shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under
this chapter:(3) Gifts, bequests, devises, and inheritances. - The value of the property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance. ..
3 I.T. 1651, CB 1I-1, 54 (1923).
4 I.T. 1667, CB 11-1, 83 (1923).
-Pauline C. Washburn v. Comm. of Int. Rev., 5 T.C. 1333 (1945)
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is income or excluded as a gift, emphasis should be given to the fact
that the individual takes part in the contest and performs the condi-
tions." The determining element deduced from court decisions and the
Commissioner's rulings seems to be that if the contestant has per-
formed any conditions in order to win the award, he derives taxable
income therefrom.
In regard to awards received for scholarly work the courts and
the Commissioner are violently split. The Commissioner in 1929 con-
sidered an award received by a professional economist as a "gift" since
it was in ". . . recognition of the taxpayer's achievements in science
and his services in promoting the public welfare."17 The Commissioner,
however, since that time has changed his position and now generally
considers awards as income to the contest winner. The courts have
followed the Commissioner in his present stand; the case of MilcDer-
mott vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenues being a typical example.
This case involved an essay written by a law professor for the Ross
Essay Contest for which he received an award. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia concluded that the award was a gift,
viewing it with reference to the Nobel Prizes, Guggenheim Fellowships
and the Rhodes Scholarships. To consider otherwise, the court deduced,
would disrupt the settled policy of encouraging scholarly work. The
Commisioner is vehemently opposed to this decision and has declared
that further awards of the Ross Essay Contest would be considered
taxable incomeY The Tax Court has held upon a similar fact situation
that the award was income although in that instance the donor did not
view the award as a gift, but treated it as an expense and used it as
an advertising medium.10
The McDermott case" considered certain elements which, in de-
termining the taxability of an award are important to weigh:
1. The intent of the donor: is his purpose to give and incite
or to employ and buy?
2. Are the services that are performed rendered to the person
making the award?
3. Did the promulgators of the contest derive profit from it or
from the plaintiff's participation in it?
4. What is the contestant's motive in entering the contest?
When applying these elements to the instant case no other con-
clusion can be drawn than the award was a "gift" regardless of the
6 I.T. 3987, 1950-1 CB 0 (1950).
7 G.C.M. 5581, VIII-1 CB 68 (1929).880 U.S. App. D.C. 176 F. (2d) 585 (1945).
9 I.T. 3960, 1949-2 CB 13 (1949).t0 Herbert Stein v. Comm. of Int. Rev., 14 T.C. 494 (1950). The court in dictum
believed the decision in the McDermott case placed undue emphasis upon the
fact that the award was in the field of learning and education.
21 Supra, note 8.
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Commissioner's rulings. The expressed intent of the donor was to
make a gift and not to buy the composition. The plaintiff rendered
no services to the donor since the time and effort incidental to a com-
position of this type were expended before the contest was ever pro-
mulgated. The donor received no financial remuneration from the
contest; title to the composition remained in the plaintiff and the
donor received no pecuniary benefits from it. The plaintiff's expressed
motive for entering the contest was to make a contribution to the field
of music and coupled with that fact is the added factor that the compo-
sition was completed six years before the announcement of the con-
test. No other conclusion can be drawn except that the plaintiff entered
the contest for his expressly stated purpose.
Although it is doubtful the Commissioner will accede to the decision
in the instant case, yet to do otherwise would only serve to further
widen the gap between the courts and the Commissioner of Internal
lRevenue.
JohN J. WVrTAK
Workmen's Compensation-Effect Upon Prior Release of Em-
ployer's Election to Subscribe to Act-Claimant, an employee of The
Pocahontas Corporation, contracted silicosis in the second stage several
years before the employer elected to subscribe to the West Virginia
Workmen's Compensation Act. On October 6, 1940, claimant and his
employer entered into a compromise settlement by which the claimant
received $1,000, the amount then fixed by the act for that disability,
and the employer obtained a written release from the. claimant for
"all manner of . . . claims . . . for . . . injuries . . . ." Claimant con-
tinued in the employ of The Pocahontas Corporation. On June 15,
1943, the. employer elected to subscribe to the act. Claimant then sub-
mitted a claim to the compensation commissioner for the same dis-
ability mentioned above and was awarded $1,600, the amount then
allowed under the act. The Pocahontas Corporation set up the release as
satisfaction and discharge of the claim. The Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board, in December, 1949, reversed the order of the commis-
sioner, and claimant appealed. Held: Commissioner's order reinstated.
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, any contract or agreement
which exempts an employer or employee from the burden or waives
the benefit of the Act, is pro tanto void. Upon election to subscribe,
the employer elected to accept the obligations and burdens of the Act
as well as the benefits and protection thereof. It. in effect, waived any
defense created by the release or settlement insofar as it affected any
claim made under the Act. Vernon v. State Compensation Commis-
sioner et al., 61 S.E. (2) 243 (W.Va., 1950).
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